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I. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee agrees with Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement set 
forth in her brief. 
II. 
STANDARD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
While a reviewable question of law may be present, the trial 
court's ruling is nevertheless based upon the evidence presented at 
trial and the findings derived therefrom. It is a well-established 
rule that "due to the advantaged position of the trial judge," this 
court will indulge considerable deference to the findings. Tanner 
v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980) 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR RULES 
Appellee submits that the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-16-1 et seq. , is of central importance to the 
appeal. A copy of the statute is reproduced and contained in the 
Addendum "A" hereto. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This was a proceeding for rule violations and for unpaid rent 
that accrued during the proceedings for eviction under the Utah 
1 
Mobile Home Park Residence Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-16-1 et seq. 
The matter came on for a bench trial on Wednesday, November 2, 
1994, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley in the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, The trial court, 
having considered the evidence presented by both parties during 
trial, the testimony of the witnesses, and having reviewed a trial 
brief submitted by Appellant Johnson, including review of the cases 
cited in that brief, entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment on December 2, 1994, finding for the Plaintiff 
and against Defendant.1 
It should be further noted that the Defendant, June Johnson, 
did not testify at the trial. Appellant's defense at trial 
consisted of cross-examination and summation by her counsel. (Tr. 
at R. 764-796) 
B. Statement of Facts 
The following statements of fact are taken from the District 
Court's Findings of Fact (hereinafter lfFOFn) and Conclusions of Law 
entered herein, a copy of which are attached as Exhibit f,Elf to 
Appellant's "Appendix." 
1
 It should be noted that defense counsel's queries and 
references to Appellant's pregnancy are not properly before this 
court, since the trial court found that matter to be irrelevant to 
the trial issue. Any suggestion of that fact offered by Appellant 
in her brief should be disregarded. See Tr. at R. 753. 
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1. The parties entered into a lease agreement, which lease 
agreement included as an attachment all of the rules and 
regulations of the mobile home park dated July l, 1992, a copy of 
which was introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit "P-l." 
This lease agreement was for the lease of a mobile home space known 
as 255 E. Hidden View Drive, #267, Sandy, Utah. A copy of the 
lease agreement is attached as Exhibit !IB!I to Appellant's 
"Appendix." FOF, paragraph 1. 
2. On or about May 6, 1993, a 15-day eviction notice (Trial 
Exhibit "P-2") was served upon the Appellant, June Johnson, for 
rule violations as set forth in the notice. A copy of the lease 
agreement is attached as Exhibit "C" to Appellant's "Appendix." 
FOF, para. 2. 
3. It is the practice of Appellee to regularly enforce the 
park's rules and regulations against residents, irrespective of 
their religion, religious persuasion, family structure, or family 
status.2 FOF, para. 4. 
4. For over a period of four (4) years, the Appellee in this 
case and its predecessor in interest, was required to enforce many 
Appellant Johnson had at one time during this action 
maintained that her Polygamist lifestyle and practice was a 
motivating factor for Crescentwood Village to force eviction. 
Appellant Johnson abandoned these baseless claims at the time of 
trial, and the court found there was no substance to those claims 
as set forth in the trial court's Findings of Fact. 
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rule violations by the Appellant, June Johnson. The mobile home 
park endeavored to work with the Ms. Johnson to get her to abide by 
the rules and regulations during the subject time period. FOF, 
para. 5. 
5. The rules and regulations of the mobile home park are 
reasonable and necessary to promote the health, safety, and welfare 
of the park residents. FOF, para. 6. 
6. After the Appellant was served with the 15-day notice, 
she attempted to cure the rule violations as set forth in that 
notice. FOF, para. 7. 
7. The Appellant did cure the unlicensed vehicle violation 
and the mobile home painting violation. FOF, para. 7. 
8. The Appellant did much to cure the violation relating to 
the condition of her lot being kept in a neat, clean, and weed free 
condition. The Appellant removed some, but not all of the garbage 
and weed growth and therefore never fully cured the violation 
relating to the condition of her mobile home lot. FOF, para. 8. 
9. After the 15 day notice period expired, the Appellant 
failed to maintain her yard in a clean, neat and weed free 
condition. Appellant failed to maintain her lot by allowing 
significant new growth in weeds, new garbage, trash, and other 
objects accumulated on Appellant!s lot. FOF, para. 9. 
4 
10. After the expiration of the May 6, 1993 notice, the 
Appellant violated on several occasions another rule of the park 
relating to violation of the curfew rule for her minor son, FOF, 
para 10. 
11. After the May 6, 1993 notice had expired, the Appellant 
received two oral notices from the park's manager, Mr. Shupe, that 
she was again failing to maintain the garbage, trash, and weeds on 
her lot, which was a violation of the park rules. These verbal 
warnings were given to the Appellant in July of 1993, and the 
Appellant did absolutely nothing about the warnings and ignored 
them. FOF, para. 11. 
12. The garbage, trash, and weed problems on the Appellant's 
lot were ongoing in nature because of continued accumulation of 
weeds, trash, and garbage. The trial Court found that problem 
continued and existed at the time when Crescentwood Village served 
its notice of lease termination on August 3, 1993. The notice was 
introduced as Trial Exhibit "P-3", and is attached as Exhibit nD" 
to Appellant's "Appendix.". F0Ff para. 12. 
13. The eviction notice was served after a passage of more 
than sixty (60) days from the expiration of the May 5, 1993 notice, 
and considering the nature of the rule violations, that was a 
reasonable period of time that would not trigger or require an 
additional period of cure or an additional new 15-day notice. FOF, 
5 
para. 12 and 13. 
14. Other residents in the mobile home park have had their 
general health, safety and welfare impacted negatively as a result 
of the Appellant's failure to maintain and control the weed 
problem, the trash problem, the garbage problem, and the curfew 
violations by her son. FOF, para. 18. 
15. Crescentwood Village occasionally provided its residents 
additional trash dumpsters, made Appellant aware of the 
availability of these dumpsters for use in cleaning up her lot. 
Mrs. Johnson did not take advantage of the use of these dumpsters. 
FOF, para 20. 
16. Crescentwood Village engaged in no conduct that would 
have led the Appellant, June Johnson, to believe that it would 
waive strict compliance with the park rules, regulations, and lease 
agreement. FOF, para 21. 
17. The notices in this particular case v/ere legally 
sufficient, consistent with the lease agreement, and consistent 
with Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and Utah Code Annotated §57-16-6. 
FOF, para 2 3 . 
18. The Appellant breached the lease agreement by failing to 
follow the rules and regulations of the park, including the 
continuing nature of the violations of trash, garbage, and weeds, 
as well as the curfew violations regarding her son. FOF, para 29. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Crescentwood Village Inc. 's (lfCVIn) notices to June Johnson 
were reasonable and constructive, thereby affording her with full 
and satisfactory notification of CVI's intent to terminate the 
lease for park rule violations. Appellee further contends that CVI 
11
 temporarily waived11 its right to forfeit the lease agreement. The 
subject lease provides an unequivocal non-waiver provision. 
Furthermore, even assuming that acceptance of past due rent may, in 
certain circumstances, constitute a waiver, the lease provides a 
specific non-waiver provision against any such waiver. Mrs. 
Johnson was provided with sufficient notice and opportunity to 
cure, and her failure to do so should not constitute a waiver on 
the part of CVI. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
The Appellant's issue on this appeal is whether the district 
court erred in concluding that the [lessor's] gratuitous extension 
of the cure period specified in its 15-day notice of default did 
not require the [lessor] to provide a new, unequivocal notice that 
the cure period, as extended, would expire on a date certain.3 It 
Appellant's Docketing Statement - Paragraph 5 "Issues 
Presented by the Appeal." 
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is presumed the foregoing issue was derived from the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law (Aplt.App. Exhibit "E") entered herein, which 
specifically provides:4 
2. The Court concludes that the notices served in 
this case were legally sufficient, consistent with the 
lease agreement, and consistent with Utah State statutes, 
including Utah Code Annotated §57-16-5 and §57-16-6. 
Appellant would therefore suggest that, as a matter of law, a 
gratuitous or accommodating extension of the fifteen (15) day cure 
period set forth in the notice, thereafter imposes upon a landlord 
a legal obligation to provide additional notice of when the 
gratuitous or accommodating period terminates. Utah law on that 
point is long-settled. 
This is simply not a case where a notice to cure was served 
after a single incident of park rule violations. On the contrary, 
the conduct and complacency exhibited by Appellant over a period of 
years became ludicrous, especially after a tremendous amount of 
indulgence by the parkfs management and staff. (Tr. at R. 654) 
Moreover, the lower court specifically found in its Findings of 
Fact at paragraph 21: 
,f
....the Plaintiff engaged in no conduct that would have 
led the Defendant, June Johnson, to believe that the 
Plaintiff would waive strict compliance with the park 
rules, regulations, and lease agreement. This findings 
Appellant has failed to include in its Brief any 
reference to the record where such contention was specifically 
preserved for appeal. 
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is an additional basis why the Court finds that the 
Plaintiff was not required under the facts and 
circumstances of this case to provide new notice or a new 
opportunity to cure in this particular case after the 
first 15-day notice. The Court finds that because of the 
ongoing nature of the rule violations by the Defendant, 
that the equitable considerations in this particular case 
weigh heavily in favor of the Plaintiff and not the 
Defendant, because, among other things, the evidence 
clearly established that the Plaintiff had worked with 
the Defendant a number of times and over a long period of 
time in an effort to get her to cure rule violations, 
including those rule violations which are the subject of 
this particular lawsuit. There was a pattern established 
that the Plaintiff tried to work with the Defendant; and, 
hence, the equitable considerations in this Court's 
opinion point in favor of the Plaintiff.11 
Appellant is essentially asking the court to determine whether 
the notices which were provided to her were sufficient under the 
law, and, if so, whether CVI waived its right to forfeiture. 
Appellee submits that the notices provided to the Appellant were 
both reasonable and sufficient, and that no waiver of its rights 
under the lease resulted from its actions. Appellant can hardly 
claim ignorance of the fact that CVI was extremely interested in 
having the Appellant maintain her mobile home and lot in a 
condition which was required of the other tenants, and more 
importantly, done so expeditiously. 
The case of Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d 748 
(Utah 1948)5, is analogous to the facts presented here, wherein 
property was sold under a uniform real estate contract requiring 
Appellee's Addendum ,fBM hereto. 
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the purchasers to pay monthly installments. In that case, the 
purchasers failed from the very beginning to make the monthly 
payments as promised. For a period of approximately two (2) years, 
the sellers demanded that the contract be paid up to date, and 
assured the buyers that no forfeiture of their rights was 
contemplated at that time. The sellers were also quoted as saying 
lfdo the best you can," referring to making up the several past-due 
monthly installments. 
Finally, the sellers mailed a notice to the buyers to pay the 
amount in default within seven days, or forfeit under the contract. 
The buyer immediately contacted the sellers and began negotiations, 
which included seeking more time to bring the payments up to date. 
The seller refused anything other than full payment, only because 
the buyers did not even make payments from the beginning. 
The matter was tried to the court, which concluded that the 
sellerfs conduct was deemed to be a waiver of its rights to insist 
on prompt payments, but that the seller had not waived any right to 
declare a forfeiture. The trial court also concluded that, based 
upon the parties actions, the seller had not provided reasonable 
notice and demand to the buyers. This Court disagreed with the 
lower court, stating: 
"....The notice informed the defendants that the 
plaintiff intended, after many lenities, to insist upon 
its forfeiture rights under the contract at least as to 
past due payments. That the defendants understood 
10 
plaintiff's intentions is shown by their actions -- they 
immediately began negotiations for further time in which 
to bring their payments up to date.11 
Pacific Development Co. v. Stewart, 195 P.2d at 750 (Utah 1948). 
The question before this court in Pacific Development was 
whether the amount of time to cure the default was reasonable, and 
in view of those circumstances, the twenty-three (23) days was 
found to be sufficient. This Court, reversing a judgment for the 
purchasers and remanding, continued its reasoning concerning 
adequate notice to a defaulting party, and provided further: 
Repeated warnings without their strict enforcement 
are, of course, indicative of a willingness to waive that 
strict performance, but they also have the probative 
value of a cautionary nature. They should warn the 
buyers the seller cannot continue such conduct 
indefinitely. Under such circumstances the buyers should 
not let themselves into a position whereby they are 
forced to assume they can rely on the seller agreeing 
with them as to what would be a reasonable length of time 
to make up the delinquencies. 
Pacific Development, supra at 751. 
The import of that decision here is that Appellant should not 
have assumed that CVI would permit the lease violations to go on 
without electing a forfeiture. Appellant was warned of such action 
in the 15-day notice and by repeated verbal warnings. It is 
undisputed that Appellant was given numerous verbal and written 
warning concerning her property condition and rule violations. (Tr. 
at R. 739) These warnings went unanswered for the most part. (Tr. 
at R. 740-41) Finally, on May 6, 1993, Crescentwood Village 
11 
provided the Appellant with a final opportunity to cure the 
violations. During this period, as in Pacific Development, certain 
"lenities" were afforded under the circumstances, but certainly no 
intention to waive any right to force eviction. Crescentwood 
Village engaged in no conduct that would have led Ms. Johnson to 
believe that strict compliance with the park rules, regulations, 
and lease agreement would be waived. See Findings of Fact, para 21. 
The Appellant simply did not live up to her end of the bargain, and 
in fact made the situation much worse by allowing more weed growth, 
trash, and other oddities to pile up in her yard, including a swamp 
cooler. There is little question in this case that the Appellant 
knew what was expected of her under the lease, and certainly had 
constructive knowledge of the Parkfs rules which were attached to 
her lease. 
The undisputed fact is that even after being served with a 
notice to cure the violations, Ms. Johnson received two oral 
notices from Mr. Shupe that she was again failing to maintain the 
garbage, trash, and weeds on her lot, which Ms. Johnson knew was a 
violation of the park rules, and was the very reason she was served 
the 15-day notice in the first place. (Tr. at R. 750) Simply 
stated, Ms. Johnson did absolutely nothing about those continued 
warnings and elected to ignore them. See Findings of Fact, para. 
11. The Park and its other residents should not suffer the effects 
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of a tenant's complacent and indifferent attitude, especially when 
that tenant has received the number and frequency of notices as did 
Ms. Johnson. While the Park allowed Ms. Johnson a degree of 
tolerance, the Park maintained and voiced its position at all 
times, including forfeiture. 
Even if she had been afforded some "new" final date for the 
cure period, her previous conduct would indicate that she could not 
have cured even within that time. To hold otherwise, under these 
circumstances, would result in a tenant being able to negotiate a 
gratuitous extension of the cure period, then claim a right to 
further notice and opportunity to cure with a "new11 date certain. 
This process could be endless and effectively leave the landlord 
without adequate remedy or protection for his property. 
The subject lease agreement provides a non-waiver clause which 
provides: 
Waiver. No failure of Park to enforce any term 
hereof shall be deemed a waiver, nor shall any acceptance 
of a partial payment of rent be deemed a waiver of Park's 
right to the full amount. 
The aforesaid lease provision sets forth two (2) non-waiver 
elements; (1) failure of the Park to enforce any term therein, 
including park rules, will not result in a waiver to enforce other 
terms or rules, and (2) receipt of partial payment will not waive 
entitlement to full payment under the lease. The terms of the 
lease are unambiguous. The subject lease further provides: 
13 
Default. Should Resident(s) fail to pay rent when 
due or violate any Rule or other term or condition of 
this lease, Park may elect to (a) continue the lease in 
effect and enforce all its rights and remedies hereunder, 
including the right to recover the rent as it becomes 
due, or (b) at any time, terminate all of the Resident(s) 
rights hereunder and recover from Resident(s) all damages 
the Park may incur by reason of the breach of the lease. 
All property on the premises is hereby subject to a lien 
in favor of Park, for payment of all sums due to the 
maximum extent allowed by law. (Emphasis added) 
In Utah, a waiver of the seller's right to insist on prompt 
payment does not destroy a right to forfeit all contract terms or 
interest when lessee continually fails to perform. Christy ex ux. 
v. Guild ex ux.r 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401 (1942)6. 
It is undisputed that the lease agreement was entered into by 
the parties. (Tr. at R. 801) It is also undisputed that Appellant 
signed the subject lease agreement. Under Utah law, a contracting 
party is under a duty to read it before signing it, and will be 
considered bound by constructive knowledge of the contents thereof. 
This is merely an application of fundamental contract law. See 
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 17 Utah 2d 205, 407 
P.2d 685 (1965) Furthermore, the Rules of the park are 
incorporated within the lease, a copy of which was provided to 
Appellant at the time she signed the lease. (Tr. at R. 654) 
The Pacific Development decision provided further that 
11
 [ujnder the circumstances of this case, we believe that the 
Appellee's Addendum lfClf hereto. 
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[defendants] were given a reasonable length of time to clear 
themselves of default. There is grave doubt that they would have 
been able to accomplish that goal even with a longer time." Id. at 
751. 
In Pincrree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317 
(Utah 1976)7, the lessor initially sent a letter to lessee on 
September 24, 1974, which set forth deficiencies in the maintenance 
of the leased premises. The letter provided that if the 
deficiencies were not corrected within thirty (30) days, then 
lessor would declare a forfeiture of the lease. Following the 
September 24, 1974, notice, there were several meetings between the 
parties and the repairs were discussed. Five (5) months later on 
February 26, 1975, the lessor served notice of forfeiture of the 
lease for the lesseefs failure to correct the deficiencies set 
forth in the letter of September 24, 1974. Analogous to the first 
notice in the present case, the first notice in Pingree notified 
the lessee to cure the deficiencies or face forfeiture. The 
parties in Pingree commenced a period of discussion amounting to a 
forbearance period of approximately 150 days, which is twice the 
duration of the present period of seventy days. It must be assumed 
that the lessor in Pingree neither intended nor indicated that it 
would waive its right to declare forfeiture. See Hackford v. Snow, 
7
 Appellee's Addendum lfD!! hereto. 
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657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982)(assuming that the lease in Pinaree 
contained a strict forfeiture provision when covenants were 
breached)• 
There simply is no Utah decision which requires additional 
notice of a date certain when a forbearance period will expire. In 
fact, the law pronounced in the Pacific Development decision is 
controlling, wherein a defaulting party should not presume that the 
lessor will be indefinitely tolerable of continued breach• 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's findings, conclusions, and judgment rendered in this 
matter• 
DATED this 5> day of June, 1995. 
ASHTON, BRAUNBERGER, POULSEN 
& BOUD, P.C. 
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Exhibit A 
57-15-10 RKAL ESTATE 
rOLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553 
57-15-10. Severability of provisions. 
If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter shall not 
be impaired thereby. 
History: C. 1953, 57-15-10, e n a c t e d by L. 
1981, ch. 224, § 11. 
57-15-11. Limitation on enforcement of due-on-sale 
clauses. 
After October 15, 1985, this chapter applies to any instrument described in 
Section 57-15-2 that: 
(1) was originated in this state by a financial institution other than a 
national bank, a federal savings and loan association, a federal thrift 
institution, or a federal credit union; and 
(2) was made or assumed during the period beginning on May 12, 1981, 
and ending on October 15, 1982. 
History: C. 1953, 57-15-11, e n a c t e d by L. 
1985, ch. 2, § 1. 
CHAPTER 16 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 
Section 
57-16-1. 
57-16-2. 
57-16-3. 
57-16-4. 
57-16-5. 
57-16-6. 
57-16-7. 
57-16-8. 
57-16-1. 
Short title. 
Purpose of chapter. 
Definitions. 
Termination of lease or rental 
agreement — Required con-
tents of lease — Increases in 
rents or fees — Sale of homes. 
Grounds for terminating lease. 
Action for lease termination — 
Prerequisite procedure. 
Rules of parks. 
Payment of rent and fees during 
Short title. 
Section 
57-16-9. 
57-16-10. 
57-16-11. 
57-16-12. 
57-16-15.1. 
pendency of eviction proceed-
ing. 
Lienholder's liability for rent 
and fees. 
Utility service to mobile home 
parks — Limitation on pro-
viders' charges. 
Rights and remedies not exclu-
sive. 
Waiver of rights and duties pro-
hibited. 
Eviction proceeding. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Mobile Home Park 
Residency Act." 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 1. through 12, which enacted §§ 57-16-1 through 
Meaning of "this act." — The term "This 57-16-12. 
act" in this section means L. 1981, ch. 178, §§ 1 
402 
MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY 57-16-3 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 54 Am. Jur. 2d Mobile ment § 31; 60 C.J S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Homes, Trailer Parks, and Tourist Camps § 1 Key Numbers. — Health and Environment 
et seq. «=> 32. 
C.J.S. — 39A C.J.S. Health and Environ-
57-16-2. Purpose of chapter. 
The fundamental right to own and protect land and to establish conditions 
for its use by others necessitate that the owner of a mobile home park be 
provided with speedy and adequate remedies against those who abuse the 
terms of a tenancy. The high cost of moving mobile homes, the requirements of 
mobile home parks relating to their installation, and the cost of landscaping 
and lot preparation necessitate that the owners of mobile homes occupied 
within mobile home parks be provided with protection from actual or construc-
tive eviction. It is the purpose of this chapter to provide protection for both the 
owners of mobile homes located in mobile home parks and for the owners of 
mobile home parks. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 2. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Validity of zoning or building reg- nant prohibiting or governing outside storage 
ulations restricting mobile homes or trailers to or parking of house trailers, motor homes, 
established mobile home or trailer parks, 17 campers, vans, and the like, in residential 
A.L.R.4th 106. neighborhoods, 32 A.L.R.4th 651. 
Validity and construction of restrictive cove-
57-16-3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Mobile home" means a transportable structure in one or more 
sections with the plumbing, heating, and electrical systems contained 
within the unit, which when erected on a site, may be used with or without 
a permanent foundation as a family dwelling. 
(2) "Mobile home park" means any tract of land on which two or more 
mobile home spaces leased, or offered for lease or rent, to accommodate 
mobile homes for residential purposes. 
(3) "Resident" means an individual who leases or rents space in a 
mobile home park. 
(4) "Mobile home space" means a specific area of land within a mobile 
home park designed to accommodate one mobile home. 
(5) "Rent" means charges paid for the privilege of occupying a mobile 
home space, and may include service charges and fees. 
(6) "Service charges" means separate charges paid for the use of 
electrical and gas service improvements which exist at a mobile home 
space, or for t rash removal, sewage and water, or any combination of the 
above. 
(7) "Fees" means other charges incidental to a resident's tenancy 
including, but not limited to, late fees, charges for pets, charges for storage 
of recreational vehicles, charges for the use of park facilities, and security 
deposits. 
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(8) "Change of use" means a change oi the use of a mobile home park, or 
any part of it, for a purpose other than the rental of mobile home spaces. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, * :*. 
57-16-4. Termination of lease or renta l agreement — Re-
quired contents of lease — Increases in rents or 
fees — Sale of homes, 
(1) A mobile home park or its agents may not terminate a lease or rental 
agreement upon any ground other than as specified in this chapter. 
(2) Each agreement for the lease of mobile home space shall be written and 
signed by the parties. Each lease shall contain at least the following informa-
tion: 
(a) the name and address of the mobile home park owner and any 
persons authorized to act for the owner, upon whom notice and service of 
process may be served; 
(b) the type of the leasehold, and whether it be term or periodic; 
(c) a full disclosure of all rent, service charges, and other fees presently 
being charged on a periodic basis; 
(d) the date or dates on which the payment of rent, fees, and service 
charges are due; and 
(e) all rules that pertain to the mobile home park which, if broken, may 
constitute grounds for eviction. 
(3) Increases in rent or fees for periodic tenancies shall be unenforceable 
until 60 days after notice of the increase is mailed to the resident. If service 
charges are not included in the rent, service charges may be increased during 
the leasehold period after notice to the resident is given, and increases or 
decreases in electricity rates shall be passed through to the resident. Increases 
or decreases in the total cost of other service charges shall be passed through 
to the resident. 
The mobile home park may not alter the date or dates on which rent, fees, 
and service charges are due unless a 60-day written notice precedes the 
alteration. 
(4) Any rule or condition of a lease purporting to prevent or unreasonably 
limit the sale of a mobile home belonging to a resident is void and unenforce-
able. The mobile home park may, however, reserve the right to approve the 
prospective purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident, but 
such approval may not be unreasonably withheld. The mobile home park may 
require proof of ownership as a condition of approval. The mobile home park 
may unconditionally refuse to appiove any purchaser of a mobile home who 
does not register prior to purchase. 
(5) A mobile home park may not restrict a resident's right to advertise for 
sale or sell his mobile home. However, the park may limit the size of a "for sale" 
sign affixed to the mobile home to not more than 144 square inches. 
(6) A mobile home park may not compel a resident who desires to sell his 
mobile home, either directly or indirectly, to sell it through an agent designated 
by the mobile home park. 
(7) In order to upgrade the quality of a mobile home park, it may require 
tha t a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if: 
fa) the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications; or 
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(b) the mobile home is in rundown condition or in disrepair 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 4; 1989, ch. 
110, § 1. 
57-16-5. Grounds for terminating lease. 
An agreement for the lease of mobile home space in a mobile home park may 
be terminated during its term by mutual agreement or for any one or more of 
the following causes: 
(1) failure of a resident to comply with a mobile home park rule for a 
period of 15 days after receipt of notice of noncompliance from the mobile 
home park; 
(2) repeated failure of a resident to abide by a mobile home park rule, if 
the original notice of noncompliance states that another violation of the 
same or a different rule might result in forfeiture without any further 
period of cure; 
(3) behavior by a resident which substantially endangers the security 
and health of the other residents or threatens the property in the park; 
(4) nonpayment of rent, fees, or service charges; 
(5) a change in the land use or condemnation of the mobile home park 
or any part of it. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 5. 
57-16-6. Action for lease termination — Prerequisite pro-
cedure. 
A legal action to terminate a lease based upon a cause set forth in Section 
57-16-5 may not be commenced except in accordance with the following 
procedure: 
(1) Before issuance of any summons and complaint, the mobile home 
park shall send or serve written notice to the resident or subtenant: 
(a) by delivering a copy of the notice personally; 
(b) by sending a copy of the notice through registered or certified 
mail addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence; 
(c) if the resident or subtenant is absent from his place of residence, 
by leaving a copy of the notice with some person of suitable age and 
discretion at his residence and sending a copy through the mail 
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence; or 
(d) if a person of suitable age or discretion cannot be found, by 
affixing a copy of the notice in a conspicuous place on the resident's or 
subtenant's mobile home and also sending a copy through the mail 
addressed to the resident or subtenant at his place of residence. 
(2) The notice shall set forth the cause for the notice and, if the cause is 
one which can be cured, the time within which the resident has to cure. 
The notice shall also set forth the time after which the mobile home park 
may commence legal action against the resident if cure is not effected, as 
follows: 
(a) In the event of failure to abide by a mobile home park rule, the 
notice shall provide for a 15-day cure period except in the case of 
repeated violations and, shall state that if a cure is not timely effected, 
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or a written agreement made between the mobile home park and the 
resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure period, eviction 
proceedings may be initiated immediately. 
(b) If the resident commits repeated violations of a rule, a summons 
and complaint may be issued three days after a notice is served. 
(c) If a resident behaves in a manner that substantially endangers 
the well-being or property of other residents, eviction proceedings 
may commence immediately. 
(d) If a resident does not pay rent, fees, or service charges, the 
notice shall provide a three-day cure period and, that if cure is not 
timely effected, or a written agreement made between the mobile 
home park and the resident allowing for a variation in the rule or cure 
period, eviction proceedings may be initiated immediately. 
(e) If there is a planned change in land use or condemnation of the 
park, the notice shall provide that the resident has 90 days after 
receipt of the notice to vacate the mobile home park if no governmen-
tal approval or permits incident to the planned change are required, 
and if governmental approval and permits are required, tha t the 
resident has 90 days to vacate the mobile home park after all permits 
or approvals incident to the planned change are obtained. 
(3) If the planned change in land use or condemnation requires the 
approval of a governmental agency, the mobile home park, in addition to 
the notice required by Subsection (2)(e), shall send written notice of the 
date set for the initial hearing to each resident at least seven days before 
the date scheduled for the initial hearing. 
(4) Regardless of whether the change of use requires the approval of 
any governmental agency, if the resident was not a resident of the mobile 
home park at the time the initial change of use notice was issued to 
residents the owner shall give notice of the change of use to the resident 
before he occupies the mobile home space. 
(5) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on 
causes set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5) shall be brought in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall not be treated 
as unlawful detainer actions under Title 78, Chapter 36. Eviction proceed-
ings commenced under this chapter and based on causes of action set forth 
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4) may, at the election of the mobile home 
park, be treated as actions brought under this chapter and the unlawful 
detainer provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, except, if unlawful detainer is 
charged, the court shall endorse on the summons the number of days 
within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, 
which shall not be less than five days or more than 20 days from the date 
of service. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 6; 1987, ch. 92, 
§ 81; 1989, ch. 110, § 2. 
57-16-7. Rules of parks. 
(1) A mobile home park may promulgate rules related to the health, safety, 
and appropriate conduct of residents and to the maintenance and upkeep of 
such park. No change in rule that is unconscionable is valid. No new or 
amended rule shall take effect, nor provide the basis for an eviction notice, 
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until the expiration of at least 60 days after its promulgation. Each resident, 
as a condition precedent to such rule being in effect, shall be provided with a 
copy of each new or amended rule that does not appear in their lease 
agreement. 
(2) A mobile home park may specify the type of material used, and the 
methods used in the installation of, underskirting, awnings, porches, fences, or 
other additions or alterations to the exterior of a mobile home, and may also 
specify the tie-down equipment used in a mobile home space, in order to insure 
the safety and good appearance of the park; but under no circumstances may 
it require a resident to purchase such material or equipment from a supplier 
designated by the mobile home park. 
(3) No mobile home park may charge an entrance fee, exit fee, nor instal-
lation fee, but reasonable landscaping and maintenance requirements may be 
included in the mobile home park rules. The resident is responsible for all costs 
incident to connection of the mobile home to existing mobile home park 
facilities and for the installation and maintenance of the mobile home on the 
mobile home space. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a mobile home park 
from requiring a reasonable initial security deposit. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 7. 
57-16-8. Payment of rent and fees during pendency of 
eviction proceeding. 
If a resident elects to contest an eviction proceeding, all rents, fees, and 
service charges due and incurred during the pendency of the action shall be 
paid into court according to the current mobile home park payment schedule. 
Failure of the resident to pay such amounts may, in the discretion of the court, 
constitute grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the mobile 
home park. Upon final termination of the issues between the parties, the court 
shall order all amounts paid into court paid to the mobile home park. The 
prevailing party is also entitled to court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 8. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553 
57-16-9. Lienholder's liability for rent and fees. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 38-3-2 and Section 70A-9-317, the 
lienholder of record of a mobile home is primarily liable to the mobile home 
park owner or operator for rent and service charges if a mobile home is not 
removed within 10 days after receipt of written notice that a mobile home has 
been abandoned or that a writ of restitution has been issued The lienholder, 
however, is only liable for rent that accrues after receipt of such notice. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 9. 
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57-16-10. Utility service to mobile home parks — Limita-
tion on providers ' charges. 
Local water, sewer, and sanitation entities, including those administered by 
municipalities and counties which provide water, sewer, or garbage collection 
services shall not receive a greater percentage net return from supplying a 
mobile home park than said entity receives from other residential customers. 
The net return is determined by taking into consideration the costs of 
maintenance and depreciation of the mobile home park facilities and all 
savings on administrative costs, including cost of billing residents. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 10. 
57-16-11. Rights and remedies not exclusive. 
The rights and remedies granted by this chapter are cumulative and not 
exclusive. 
History: L. 1981, ch 178, 5 11. 
57-16-12. Waiver of r ights and duties prohibited. 
No park or resident may agree to waive any right, duty, or privilege 
conferred by this chapter. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 178, § 12. 
57-16-15.1. Eviction proceeding. 
(1) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes 
of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(1), (2), and (5), and eviction 
proceedings commenced under this chapter based on causes of action set forth 
in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), where a landlord elects to bring an action 
under this chapter and not under the unlawful detainer provisions of Title 78, 
Chapter 36, shall provide for the following: 
la) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A 
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff may include an order of 
restitution of the premises. The judgment may also declare the forfeiture 
of the lease or agreement. 
(b) The jury or the court, if the proceedings are tried without a jury or 
upon the defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to 
the plaintiff from any of the following: 
(i) waste of the premises during the resident's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the complaint and proved; and 
(ii) the amount of rent due. 
(c) The judgment shall also provide for reasonable attorneys' fees, if 
they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(d) If the proceeding is contested, the prevailing party is entitled to 
court costs and attorneys' fees, regardless of whether the lease agreement 
provides for the same. 
(e) In all cases, after judgment has been entered, judgment and resti-
tution may be enforced immediately, except, however, if a resident tenders 
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to the mobile home park postjudgment rent, in the form of cash, cashier's 
check, or certified funds, then restitution may be delayed for the period of 
time covered by the postjudgment rent, which time period shall not exceed 
15 days from the date of the judgment unless a longer period is agreed to 
in writing by the mobile home park. 
(2) Eviction proceedings commenced under this chapter and based on causes 
of action set forth in Subsections 57-16-5(3) and (4), in which the mobile home 
park has elected to t reat as actions also brought under the unlawful detainer 
provisions of Title 78, Chapter 36, shall be governed by Section 78-36-10 with 
respect to judgment for restitution, damages, rent, enforcement of the judg-
ment and restitution. 
History: C. 1953,57-16-15.1, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 110, § 3. 
CHAPTER 17 
RESIDENTIAL RENTERS' DEPOSITS 
Section 
57-17-1. 
57-17-2. 
57-17-3. 
Return or explanation of 
retainage upon termination of 
tenancy. 
Non-refundable deposit — Writ-
ten notice required. 
Deductions from deposit — Writ-
ten itemization — Time for re-
turn. 
Section 
57-17-4. 
57-17-5. 
Holder of owner's or designated 
agent's interest bound by provi-
sions. 
Failure to give renter required no-
tice — Recovery of deposit, pen-
alty and costs. 
57-17-L Return or explanation of retainage upon termi-
nation of tenancy. 
Owners or designated agents requiring deposits however denominated from 
renters leasing or renting residential dwelling units shall either return those 
deposits a t the termination of the tenancy or provide the renter with written 
notice explaining why any deposit refundable under the terms of the lease or 
rental agreement is being retained. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 74, § 1. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. Landlord-Tenant 
Law: A Perspective on Reform in Utah, 1981 
Utah L. Rev. 727, 751. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Necessity 
or Overkill? Regulating Residential Landlord-
Tenant Relations through the Utah Consumer 
Sales Practices Act, 1990 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1063. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and 
Tenant §§ 651 to 657. 
C.J.S. 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant 
§§ 472(1) to 476. 
A.L.R. — Landlord-tenant security deposit 
legislation, 63 A.L.R.4th 901. 
What constitutes abandonment of residential 
or commercial lease — modern cases, 84 
A.L.R.4th 183. 
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were fired. The recoid shows that in this 
demonstration the jmv weie told that a 
table in the courtroom represented the hor-
izontal position of the body at the titn^ 
the shot was fired. Demonstrations oi 
physical facts are often made by attorneys 
in aigumcnts to juries. There was evi-
dence introduced at the trial as to the 
course the bullets took. The jury could 
not have been misled by the demonstration. 
We are of the opinion that appellant was 
not prejudiced by the district attorney's 
acts in that regard. 
[6] Appellant next contends that the 
court erred in refusing to grant a new trial. 
He argues that the evidence is clear that 
appellant acted in self-defense and that 
therefore the verdict is contrary to the law 
and the evidence adduced at the trial. If 
the only evidence in the case was that pro-
duced by appellant this argument might 
have some weight. However, as we point-
ed out in our first opinion in this case, 
there was sufficient evidence from which a 
jury might reasonably find the appellant 
guilty of murder in the first degree. The 
court therefore did not err in refusing to 
grant a new trial. 
Affirmed. 
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and PRATT and 
LATIMER, JJ., concur. 
WOLFE, J., concurs in the result. 
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT CO. v. STEW-
ART et ux. 
No. 7082. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 2, 1948. 
I. Vendor and purchaser <§=>I87 
Fact that vendor did not insist on 
prompt payments by purchasers of install-
ments due under uniform real estate con-
tract which provided that purchasers 
should pay S55 a month and which pro-
vided that vendor's acceptance of pay-
ments for less than according to terms of 
contiact, should in no way alter teims of 
contract as to forfeiture, was not a waiver 
by vendor of strict performance of the 
contract.1 
2. Vendor and purchaser C='299(2) 
Acceptance by vendor of purchasers' 
past due payment under uniform real es-
tate contract, and vendor's other conduct 
towards purchasers, leading purchasers to 
belie\e that strict performance would not 
be required by vendor, imposed on vendor 
duty of giving to purchasers a reasonable 
notice before vendor could insist on strict 
performance by purchasers. 
3. Vendor and purchaser <S=>299(2) 
Vendor's notice to purchasers that real 
estate contract between them for the pur-
chase of certain house was in default be-
cause of non-payment of principal and in-
terest in amount of $557.50 and that unless 
full amount of such payments and interest 
in default was paid to attorney for vendor 
within seven days vendor elected to declare 
contract forfeited in accordance with 
terms thereof, was reasonable notice to 
purchasers that vendor was no longer waiv-
ing strict performance of the contract and 
would insist on its right to forfeit. 
4. Appeal and error <&^B4I 
Where facts in unlawful detainer ac-
tion surrounding attempted forfeiture of 
uniform real estate contract by vendor, be-
cause of defaults by purchasers, were un-
disputed, the Supreme Court on appeal 
might determine, as a matter of law, what 
was a reasonable time of vendor's notice 
to purchasers of intent to forfeit contract. 
Utah Code 1943, 104—30—3. 
5. Vendor and purchaser C=^299(2) 
Vendor's notice of 23 days to pur-
chasers of intention to forfeit uniform real 
estate contract because of purchasers' de-
fault in payment of $557.50 of principal 
and interest, was reasonable time. 
1 Leone v. Zunfca, 84 Utah 417, 34 P. v. Guild et ux., 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 
2d G99, 94 A.L.K. 1232; Christy et ux. 401. 
PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT TO. v. STEWART 
Cite as 195 P.2d 748 
Utah 719 
Appeal from District Court, Fourth Ju-
dicial District, Utah County; Joseph E. 
Nelson, Judge. 
Unlawful detainer action by the Pacific 
Development Company against J. B. Stew-
art and Corilla Stewart, his wife. From 
an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals. 
Judgment reversed and case remanded 
for findings and decree in accordance with 
opinion. 
Clair M. Aldrich, of Provo, for appel-
lant. 
L E. Brockbank, of Provo, for respond-
ents. 
PRATT, Justice. 
This action was commenced under Sec-
tion 104—60—3, U.C.A.1943, our unlawful 
detainer statute. Many of the facts were 
stipulated. 
Pacific Development Company, plaintiff 
and appellant, sold to J. P. Stewart and 
Corilla Stewart, his wife, a house and lot 
in Provo, Utah, for the sum of $5900.00. 
The agreement of sale and purchase was 
the typical "Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract". Purchasers agreed to pay amounts 
totaling $100.00 before entering into pos-
session and $55.00 a month each month 
thereafter, the first payment to be October 
1, 1944. The O.P.A. rental ceiling of $50.-
00 per month was testified to as the reason-
able rental value of the property. 
From the outset the purchasers did not 
make their payments in accordance with 
the contract. Sometimes they paid less 
than the installment required. They did 
not pay on the 1st day of the month, but on 
various days. In November, 1944, payment 
was not made until the 29th. No payment 
of any amount was made in December of 
1944. During 1945 the purchasers failed 
to pay any amount in the months of Au-
gust, November or December. This con-
duct was continued until October 24, 1946, 
at which time the purchasers were in ar-
rears $557.50—their last payment was Oc-
tober 14, 1946. From time to time between 
October, 1944 and October, 1946, the sel-
ler demanded that the contract be paid up 
to date and from time to time the buyers 
were assured that no forfeiture of their 
rights was at that time contemplated, but 
that they should, "do the best you can" or 
they should catch it up as fast as they 
could. 
Finally on October 24, 1946, the seller 
mailed the following notice to the purchas-
ers: 
"You are hereby notified that the real 
estate contract by and between the Pacific 
Development Company as seller and your-
selves as purchasers, for the purchase of 
the house and lot located at 1069 East 5th 
South, Provo, is now in default on your 
part by reason of non-payment of principal 
and interest in the amount of Five Hun-
dred Fifty Seven Dollars and Fifty Cents 
($557.50), and that unless the full amount 
of said payments and interest in default 
are paid to the undersigned attorney for 
the seller within seven days (7) from date 
the seller elects to declare said contract 
forfeited in accordance with the terms 
thereof. 
"Dated 24th day of October, 1946." 
Immediately after the quoted notice was 
received the buyers began negotiations 
with the seller. It was their purpose to 
get further time in which to bring their 
payments up to date. The seller objected 
to any payments except the full amount 
due on the contract—$557.50. (The amount 
appears as $562.50 at one place in the tes-
timony.) However, the way was left open 
for further negotiation up until November 
11, 1946, Armistice Day, due to Mr. Stew-
art's work. On November 12, 1946, a no-
tice to quit in accordance with 104—60—3, 
U.C.A.1943, was served upon the buyers 
giving them five days in which to bring 
their contract up to date or return posses-
sion to the seller. On November 19, 1946, 
the complaint in this action was filed. The 
lower court rendered a "Decree" of no 
cause of action which, of course, denied the 
plaintiff a writ of possession. Plaintiff 
has appealed. 
The facts related above are undisputed. 
The plaintiff, as we understand its actions, 
is here attempting to declare a forfeiture 
of the defendants' interest in the property 
not because the defendants have failed to 
pay any particular payment at the time it 
was due but because of their failure to 
77)0 i t:ui 
b r i ng (.lie loin; overdue payments up to 
da te af ter notice. 
Uno of the provisions of the cont rac t af-
fec . ing forfeiture is as follows: 
" I t is understood and agreed that if the 
seller accepts payments from the buyer on 
this contrac t less than according to the 
te rms herein mentioned then by so doing, 
it will in no way alter the te rms of the 
con t r ac t as to forfeiture he re ina f t e r stipu-
l a t e d ; ' 
Actua l forfeiture was provided for in 
the following l anguage : 
" In the event of a failure to comply with 
the t e rms hereof by the Buyer , or upon 
fai lure to make any payments when the 
same shall become due, or within 20 days 
the rea f t e r , the Seller shall, at his option, 
be released from all obligations in law and 
equi ty to convey said property and all pay-
men t s which have been made the re to fo re 
on this contract by the Buyer , shall be for-
feited, to the Seller as l iquidated damages 
for the non-performance o^ the con t rac t 
and the Buyer agrees t h a t ; t h e Seller may, 
a t his option re-enter and take possession 
of said premises without, legal process as 
in its first and former estate, t oge the r with 
all improvements and addi t ions made by 
the Buyer thereon, and the said addi t ions 
and improvements shall r emain wi th the 
land, and become the proper ty of the Sel-
ler , the Buyer becoming at once a t enan t at 
will of the Seller. It is agreed that t ime 
is the essence of this ag reemen t . " ( I ta l ics 
added. ) 
[1 ] T h e lower cour t concluded tha t 
plaintiff had waived the strict pe r fo rmance 
of the contract . However , that wa iver of 
the seller 's right to insist on prompt pay-
men t s did not destroy its r ight to forfeit 
de fendan t s ' interest when they cont inual ly 
failed to perform (see first quota t ion 
above ) . Christy ct ux. v. Guild ct ux., 
101 Utah 313, 121 R 2 d 401. T h o u g h sel-
ler ' s conduct may have led the buyers to 
believe that the seller would not insist on 
p rompt payments being made , no th ing 
abou t its actions should have led them to 
bel ieve that the seller h a d pe rmanen t ly 
waived its r ight to declare a for fe i ture of 
wha teve r interest buyers had in the con-
t rac t . Noth ing in the t e rms of the con-
tract , or the acts of the par t ies indicate an 
intention to penalize the seller for leniency. 
The quoted provisions of the contract con-
templated a notice from seller to buyer 
that seller intended to exerc ise its optirn 
of forfei ture. Leone v. Zuniga , 84 Utah 
417, 34 i \2d 699, 94 A.L.R. 1232. Such 
notice was not given immediately upon any 
of the defaults first o c c u r r i n g ; but that did 
not mean that seller was go ing to continue 
such conduct forever . 
[2] T h e r e is no quest ion that the ac-
ceptance by the seller of buyers ' past due 
payments and its o the r conduct toward the 
buyers leading the la t te r to believe that 
strict per formance would not be required 
by the seller, imposes upon the seller the 
duty of giving to the buyer a reasonable 
notice before it may insist on strict per-
formance by the buyers . In Brown v. 
Chowchilla Land Co., 59 Cal .App. 164, 
210 P. 424, at page 427, the court s ta ted : 
" T h e requi rement of notice af ter the 
receipt of overdue paymen t s without ob-
ject ion is based upon the equitable consid-
erat ion that by his conduct the vendor has 
led the vendee into the belief that the 
former will cont inue to waive the strict 
performance of the con t rac t . " (Italics 
curs . ) 
[3] T h e lower cou r t concluded that the 
notice and demand tha t the plaintiff gave 
defendants were not reasonable . With 
that conclusion we canno t agree . T h e no-
tice (quoted above) informed the defend-
ants that the plaintiff in tended, af ter many 
lenities, to insist upon its forfei ture rights 
under the cont rac t at least as to past due 
payments . T h a t the defendants under-
stood plaintiff's in ten t ions is shown by 
their ac t ions—they immediate ly began ne-
got ia t ions for fu r the r t ime in which to 
br ing their payments up to date . W a s the 
t ime allowed them to accomplish this, a 
reasonable length of t ime? 
T h e letter of O c t o b e r 24, 1946, demanded 
payment within 7 days . Mrs . S tewar t in 
response the re to s t a r t ed negotiat ions to 
get further t ime, reques t ing until January 
1, 1947, to make up past due payments. 
T h a t request was refused, but further ne-
got iat ions were an t i c ipa ted and a consulta-
tion with Mr . S t e w a r t was requested by 
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the plaintiff for November 11, 1946 De-
fendants ignored that request On No-
vember 12, 1946 the notice to quit was 
served on the defendants. By that notice 
the defendants were given an additional 5 
days in which to pay their past due obi ga-
tions under the contract They were un-
able to do so. As a matter of fact, the de-
fendants were unable to make the pay-
ments which were past due at any time 
prior to the commencement of the action. 
There is seme suggestion in the record that 
at the time of trial (February 3, 1947) a 
sale was available, and they cou1d p ly up. 
They had been trying to sell the propeity 
presumably to get out of the deal, whole. 
Although the notice mailed on October 
24th gdve defendants only 7 days in which 
to pay there were 23 days (October 25, 
1946—November 17, 1946) actually allowed 
them 
The contract itself provided a 20 day 
grace period for the payment of install-
ments, before forfeiture might be enforced. 
(See second quotation from contract) 
The timc actually allowed after the no-
tice of October 24, 1946, was 23 days. 
Of course, one must recognize that it 
is much harder to raise $557 SO than it 
would be to raise one installment of $55 00. 
There is rocm for argument that the men-
tion of 20 days in the contract is not nec-
essarily a good measure of a reasonable 
time where the sum in default has become 
quite large That 20 days, however, is not 
limited to just an installment pa>ment, but 
applies to other delinquencies Be that as 
it ma\, the seller in this case has made re-
peated efforts to induce the buyers to com-
ply With their contract The first letter 
is dated as early as Apnl 25, 1945, calling 
their attention to the date installments 
were due, with which buyers had not com-
plied Letters subsequent to that were dat-
ed in December 1945, and in January and 
March of 1946, then followed the ones re-
ferred to picviously in the body of the 
opinion 
Repeated warnings without their strict 
enforcement arc, ot course, indicative of a 
willingness to waive that strict perform-
ance, but they also have probative value 
ot a cautionary nature They should wain 
the buyers the seller cannot continue such 
conduct indefinitely Under such circum-
stances the buyers should not let them-
selves into a position whereby they are 
forced to assume they can rely on the sel-
ler agreeing With them as to whit would 
be a reasonable lengdi of time to make up 
delinquencies 
Under the cncumstances of this case, 
we believe that the buyers, the defendants, 
wcie given a reasonable length of time 
to clear themselves of default There is 
grave doubt that they would ha\e been 
able to accomplish that goal even with a 
longer tunc They had not paid the equiv-
alent of the rental value of the property 
for the time they occupied it. 
[4,5] Where the facts surrounding the 
transaction are uiulisj utul, as they are in 
this case, this court may deteimme, as a 
matter of law, what is a lciscnable tune. 
First National Dai k v 'Pipe & Contraetors 
Supply Co , 2 O r , 271 F 105 at pages 107, 
10S We hold that 23 days was a reason-
able time to ail)w defendants to make up 
the oveulue payments under the circum-
stances of this case. A writ of possession 
should have issued in accordance with Sec-
tion 104—60—3, U C A 1943. 
I h e judgment of the lower court is re-
\erbcd and the ea^e is reminded for find-
uigb and decree in accordance with this 
opinion Costs to appellant. 
W \DC, WOLFE, and LATIMER, JJ., 
concur 
McDONOUGH, C. J., concurs in the re-
sult. 
Exhibit C 
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til a notice of intention to forfeit unless all 
arrearages shall be paid before a certain 
date has been served on the defaulting buy-
er and has not been complied with. Such 
is not the contract nor is it the rule or prac-
tice. The trial court committed no error in 
overruling the general demurrer. 
[6] There are two other assignments 
mentioned in the brief but not argued there-
in. One is that no notice of forfeiture was 
served upon Ethel Sorenson, wife of O. G. 
Sorenson, the purchaser. There is no merit 
to this assignment. It is disposed of by 
the decision of this court in McNeil v. Mc-
Neil, 61 Utah 141, 211 P. 988. 
Complaint is made as to Finding of Fact 
Number Twelve. It is conceded by re-
spondent that such finding is outside the is-
sues and the record, and should not have 
been made by the court. However, super-
fluous finding does not affect the merits of 
the judgment in general. Finding of Fact 
Number Twelve, Conclusion of Law *C\ 
and the next to the last paragraph of the 
decree are beyond the issues and evidence 
and should be stricken. 
[7] The Bank argues that the judgment 
should be amended to provide for recovery 
of the 1939 rental. No cross-assignments 
are made and no cross-appeal taken, so that 
matter is not before us. 
The cause is remanded to the District 
Court with directions to correct the findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment 
as indicated. As so amended the judgment 
is affirmed. 
Respondent to recover costs. 
MOFFAT, C J., and WOLFE, Mc-
DONOUGH, and PRATT, JJ., concur. 
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sale of realty were unpaid at the tuno ven-
dors served notice on purchasers that con-
tract would he terminated and purchasers' 
lights thereunder forfeited unless such pay-
ments were made and other terms of con-
tract complied with within 12 days, and that 
no attempt to make such payments was made 
until after notice to vacate had been served 
on purchasers subsequent to termination of 
the contract by vendors, there was no ques-
tion for the jury as to whether there had 
been a default in the performance of teims 
of contract. 
2. Vendor and purchaser C=>95(3) 
Where contract for sale of realty specif-
ically provided that the acceptance by ven-
dors of payments thereunder other than ac-
cording to terms of contract would in no way 
alter terms thereof as to forfeiture, the ac-
ceptance by vendors, after giving purchasers 
notice of intention to enforce forfeiture pro-
visions of contract if payments were not 
made on time, of payment past due at the 
time such notice was given, did not "waive" 
contract provision as to time being of the es-
sence thereof, nor preclude vendors from 
terminating contract in accordance with 
terms thereof for purchasers' noncompliance 
therewith.i 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Waive". 
3. Vendor and purchaser <S^298 
In vendors' unlawful detainer action for 
restitution of realty in the possession of pur-
chasers under a contract of sale, where pur-
chasers failed td make past-due payments in 
compliance with notice served on them by 
vendors of intention to terminate contract 
in accordance with provisions thereof unless 
payments were made and other provisions 
of contract complied with in 12 days, and 
notice to quit was accordingly served on pur-
chasers, vendors weie entitled to a directed 
verdict determining that they had the right 
to possession of the realty, regardless of 
whether other provisions of the contract 
were in default. Kev.St.1033, 101-60-3. 
4. Damages 080(3) 
In an equitable action, court will take 
into consideration what has been paid upon 
a contract for the sale of real property in de-
Where it was admitted that several termining whether a forfeiture provision of 
monthly payments due under contract for the contract will be enforced by it.2 
CHRISTY et ux. v. GUILD et ux. 
No. 6320. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 22, 1042. 
I. Vendor and purchaser <3=>298 
1 Fausett v. General Electric Contracts 
Corporation, Utah, 112 P.2d 140. 
121 P.2d—26 
2 Croft v. Jensen, M> Utah 13, 10 P 2d 
10S; Dunbar v. Hansen, GS Utah 3DS, 
250 P. 0S2. 
402 r t< l l» 121 vwwic \ii:vi)iviLii, 2d si<;iui;s 
5. Vendor and purchaser C=>298 
In Ttah it is thp < oniuion pi.icheo, \\ iioro 
ronlty is in Hie {xj^os^ion of put chamois 
who .no in default uudor contiaet of sal<\ 
to bring an unlawful detainer action against 
such purehaseis. Kev.St.1933, 104 00-3.3 
6. Damages @=>80(3) 
Where contract for sale of realty provid-
ed for no down payment and the net month-
ly income from the lealty was sufficient to 
more than compensate for payments made 
under contract and improvements placed on 
premises by purchasers, contract provision, 
authorizing vendors to terminate contract 
for default in payment and retain as liqui-
dated damages all payments theretofore 
made, was not imalid as providing for a 
"penalty" so as to preclude vendors, who 
had tciinitiated contract in accordance with 
such provision and sened puichasers with 
notice to quit, from maintaining unlawful 
detainer action for restitution of the realty. 
Ilev.SU933, 104-00-3.4 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for all other definitions of 
"Penalty". 
Appeal from District Court, Third Dis-
trict, Salt Lake County; Oscar W. Mc-
Conkie, Judge. 
Unlawful detainer action by John Chris-
ty and Kathryn E. Christy, husband and 
wife, against Edward L. Guild and Ma-
bel C. Guild, husband and wife, for res-
titution of certain realty in the posses-
sion of defendants under a contract of 
sale and for treble damages for the un-
lawful detention of the realty. From a 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs, entered up-
on a directed verdict, defendants appeal. 
Judgment affirmed. 
J. D. Skeen and E. J. Skeen, both of Salt 
Lake City, for appellants, 
H. L. Mulliner and H. G. Metos, both of 
Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
MCDONOUGH, justice. 
This is an unlawful detainer action, orig-
inally commenced in the City Court of Salt 
Lake City, for the restitution of certain 
premises in the possession of Edward L. 
Guild and Mabel C. Guild, his wife, under 
a contract of sale, from John Christy and 
Kathryn E. Christy, his wife. Under the 
3 Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 292 
P. 20(3. 
contract, entered into in 1035, the Guilds 
were to pay $3,200 for the property in 
monthly installments of $30, including both 
principal and interest. They further agreed 
to make certain improvements on the front 
and rear of the house located on the prop-
erty and to pay all taxes and assessments 
and keep the property insured against fire. 
On April 30, 1940, respondents served ap-
pellants with notice that in accordance with 
the terms thereof, the contract would be 
terminated for failure (1) to make month-
ly installments totalling $130, (2) to make 
the improvements provided for, and (3) 
to pay the taxes and insurance in the 
amount of $297.20, unless said payments, 
with interest, and said improvements were 
made before May 12, 1940. The notice con-
cluded: "Unless you [comply by May 12] 
you shall, in accordance with the provisions 
of said contract, and by the election of said 
Sellers, forfeit as liquidated damages all 
pa\ merits heretofore made by you on said 
contract and will become a tenant at will 
of the said John Christy and Kathryn E. 
Christy of the real property". Nothing was 
done to comply with the conditions of the 
notice; and on the 15th of May, 1940, a 
notice to quit was served on appellants. 
Upon failure of the Guilds to vacate, this 
action was commenced. The complaint, in 
addition to setting out the above facts, fur-
ther alleged: "That the plaintiffs are enti-
tled to the immediate possession of said 
premises. That the defendants have failed, 
refused and neglected to surrender said 
premises and still continue in possession 
thereof and still refuse to surrender the 
same to the plaintiffs. That the monthly 
value of the rents and profits of said prem-
ises is the reasonable sum of $75.00." Then 
followed a prayer for restitution of the 
premises and for treble damages for the 
unlawful detention. 
Appellants answered, admitting the alle-
gations of the complaint as to the exist-
ence and terms of the contract of sale. 
As to the asserted defaults in the perform-
ance of the contract, however, it was al-
leged (1) that the provisions with respect 
to improvements were waived; (2) that a 
note had been given for the payment of 
taxes and insurance upon which note pay-
ments had been made; and (3) that pay-
ments on the contract had been made to 
and including March 31, 1940, and that "be-
4Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 
P. 98. 
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fore the institution of this suit they [de-
fendants] tendered to the said plaintiffs 
the total amount due upon said contract, 
exclusive of the said note, to-wit: the sum 
of $130." 
The answer further set out that appel-
lants had made improvements on said prop-
erty of the approximate cost and value of 
$2,000; that they had made 49 payments 
upon the contract of sale from March 16, 
1935, to March 31, 1940, "in various 
amounts aggregating a total of $1,647.67." 
The other allegations of the complaint were 
denied, except defendants admitted "that 
they refused to surrender the premises to 
the plaintiffs and allege that they have a 
legal right to retain possession of the same." 
The case was first tried in the city court 
and then appealed to the district court, 
where it was tried before a jury. At the 
conclusion of the evidence the court, on 
motion, directed a verdict for respondents, 
granting restitution of the premises and 
assessing damages in the sum of $137.50, 
which sum, in accordance with the prayer 
of the complaint, was trebled. 
This appeal presents two problems for 
our consideration: (1) Whether in view 
of the evidence the issues as to the alleged 
defaults of appellants should have been 
submitted to the jury; and (2) whether at 
all events the trial court should have con-
sidered the "equities" between the parties 
and adjudged that appellants were entitled 
to some reimbursement for the improve-
ments made and for the large amount paid 
on the contract (approximately one-third 
of the principal sum, plus interest). 
[1] We conclude, from a review of the 
record, that the lower court did not err in 
refusing to submit to the jury the question 
of whether there had been a default in the 
performance of the terms of the contract. 
As to the delinquency in making payments 
on the contract amounting to $130, it has 
never been urged that such default did not 
exist. Nor was any attempt made to make 
up such delinquency until after the notice 
to vacate had been served on appellants 
subsequent to the termination of the con-
tract by respondents. It is argued, however, 
that there had been a waiver of the term 
of the contract as to time being of the es-
sence thereof and that reasonable notice 
was not given of respondent's intention to 
enforce the contract in this respect for fail-
ure to make the payments as stipulated. 
Payments were not made strictly in accord-
ance with the terms of the contract from 
the very beginning. But commencing with 
January, 1940, the appellants were given 
notice of intention to enforce the forfeiture 
provisions of the contract if payments were 
not made in time, and appellants promised 
to make the required payments. Notwith-
standing, on April 30, 1940, appellants were 
in arrears on monthly installments for part 
of December, 1939, and for all of January, 
February, March, and April, 1940. Appel-
lants point to the fact that a payment was 
made on the contract on March 31, 1940, 
as an indication of waiver of defaults in 
making the monthly installments. This 
payment, applied on past due installments, 
brought the payments up to and including 
part of December, 1939. 
[2] We are of the opinion that under 
the state of facts here presented, the ac-
ceptance of the payment of March 31, 1940, 
on past due installments did not for several 
reasons result in a waiver. In the first 
place the contract of the parties specifically 
provided that the acceptance by the ven-
dors from the vendees of payments there-
under other than according to the terms of 
the contract would in no way alter the terms 
thereof as to forfeiture. Discussing a sim-
ilar provision in a contract for the sale of 
realty the California District Court of Ap-
peals in Brown v. Chowchilla Land Co., 59 
Cal.App. 164, 210 P. 424, 427, hearing de-
nied by Supreme C6urt, stated: 
"If the parties had expressly provided 
that the acceptance by the vendor of pay-
ments after they were due should not be 
deemed a waiver of
 :the provision that time 
is of the essence of the contract and should 
not be considered a relinquishment of the 
vendor's right to claim a forfeiture for 
any subsequent default on the part of the 
vendee, then it would not be illegal or in-
equitable for the vendor to insist upon for-
feiture for any such subsequent default. 
The requirement of notice after the re-
ceipt of overdue payments without objec-
tion is based upon the equitable considera-
tion that by his conduct the vendor has 
led the vendee into the belief that the for-
mer will continue to waive the strict per-
formance of the contract. The principle 
of equitable estoppel is involved. But the 
reason for the rule does not exist where 
the parties have expressly agreed that such 
waiver shall not affect any subsequent 
breach or relinquish the right of the ven-
dor to insist thereafter upon a strict ob-
servance of the terms of the contract. We 
think the parties could not have more ef-
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fectually provided that a waiver of a bicach 
of the contract should not be held to have 
occurred by reason of the forbearance of 
the vendor to take advantage of any prior 
default. 
"The parties could not fail to understand 
from the particular covenant in question 
that the acceptance of any overdue pay-
ment or payments was to be regarded as an 
indulgence to the vendee, but as to the fu-
ture the whole contract remained in full 
force and effect and rendered the vendee 
subject to the penalty of forfeiture for any 
default thereafter. We may repeat that 
the right to declare a forfeiture for the 
failure to pay on time is one of the cove-
nants of the contract and hence it is a part 
of the agreement which the parties have in 
effect declared shall not be deemed waived 
or affected by any previous default. The 
case therefore stands as though there had 
been no belated acceptance of payments, 
and since there were several installments 
long overdue at the time the action was 
brought, plaintiff was clearly in default, 
and the right of forfeiture, existed in be-
half of defendant, no affirmative action 
being required on his part to work a can-
celation." 
Secondly, after the notice to pay up was 
given in January, the payment made was 
on delinquencies existing prior thereto. 
"The acceptance of a past due installment 
or installments does not affect the notice, 
previously given, that in the future strict 
performance will be required." 66 C.J. 483, 
Sec. 383. Of a like state of facts, the court 
in Watkins v. Warren, 122 Cal.App. 617, 
10 P.2d 500, 502, said: "But there is no 
merit to appellants' contention that, by the 
acceptance after October 10, 1928, of fur-
ther installments on these past-due pay-
ments, respondents waived the demand of 
October 10, 1928, restoring the time is of 
the essence clause. This notice is in no 
way affected by acceptance of past-due pay-
ments which were past due at the time the 
notice was given, nor is it retroactive. The 
notice is intended to affect and can affect 
only such pa>ments as may become due 
after the date of the notice. If plaintiffs 
have accepted any past-due payment which 
became due after October 10, 1928, they 
have again waived the time is of the es-
sence clause. The only payments set out 
in appellants' amendment to the answer by 
which they claim a waiver are these which 
were due and in default before the date 
of plaintiffs' notice. The authorities cited, 
supra, are clear on this point." 
Sec, also, .is to default in making a 
monthly pa>ment, Fau^ett v. General Elec-
tric Contracts Corp, Utah, 112 P 2d 149. 
See Cassiday v. Adamson, 208 Iowa 417, 
224 N.W. 508. 
[3] As we view the evidence, there was 
nothing to submit to the jury on the issue 
of default. There was a clear breach of 
the contract in regard to the monthly in-
stallments due under the contract. We, 
therefore, need not consider the effect of 
the failure to make the improvements pro-
vided for by the contract, nor do we need 
to determine the legal significance of the 
taking of a promissory note for the delin-
quent taxes and insurance which appellants 
urge constituted a pa>ment of these items. 
What we do determine is that appellants 
defaulted in the performance of the terms 
of the contract, as a result of which after 
giving appellants an opportunity to per-
form, respondents, in accordance with the 
specific terms thereof, terminated the same 
and declared appellants to be tenants at 
will; that in view of the evidence the trial 
court properly directed a verdict in favor 
of respondents determining that they had 
the right to possession of the premises in-
volved. 
[4] The second problem involves a de-
termination of whether in an unlawful de-
tainer action brought pursuant to the pro-
visions of Section 104-60-3, R.S.U.1933, the 
defendant may raise and the trial court con-
sider the "equities" which may exist be-
tween the parties. It is clear that this ac-
tion is strictly one in unlawful detainer. 
It was so treated by the parties and by the 
court, the latter trebling the damages found, 
as provided for in such actions. Appellants, 
however, contend that since a forfeiture 
of a contract of sale of real property is in-
volved in this case, and since there has been 
a considerable amount paid on the contract 
by appellants, in addition to the making of 
improvements of the alleged value of $2,-
000, the court should consider this as one 
element in determining whether respond-
ents are entitled to possession of the prem-
ises or were entitled to terminate the con-
tract. To support this contention cases are 
cited to the effect that the court in an eq-
uitable action will take into consideration 
what has been paid upon a contract for the 
sale of real property in determining wheth-
er a forfeiture provision of the contract 
will be enforced by it. See Croft v. Jen-
sen, S6 Utah 13, 40 P.2d 198. On the other 
hand, we are confronted with the conten-
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tion by respondents that in a summary 
action such as this for an unlawful detain-
er the only issue presented to the court is 
the right to possession where the relation-
ship of landlord and tenant exists and that 
no equitable defense may be interposed or 
considered. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 
292 P. 206; Dunbar v. Hansen, 68 Utah 
398, 250 P. 982; Yukon Inv. Co. v. Cres-
cent Meat Co., 140 Wash. 136, 248 P. 377; 
Aegerter v. Hayes, 55 S.D. 337, 226 N.W. 
345; Grylls v. Hergiton, 268 Mich. 35, 255 
N.W. 334; William Weisman Realty Co. 
v. Cohen, 157 Minn. 161, 195 N.W. 898. 
Contra, Schubert v. Lowe, 193 Cal. 291, 
223 P. 550. 
No question has been raised in this case 
as to the right to bring an action for un-
lawful detainer by a vendor against a de-
faulting vendee. The cases are not in har-
mony as to whether such may be done. See 
Putnam v. McClain, 198 Iowa 287, 199 N. 
W. 261; Cassiday v. Adamson, 208 Iowa 
417, 224 N.W. 508; Music v. De Long, 209 
Iowa 1068, 229 N.W. 673; Clark v. Dye, 
158 Minn. 217, 197 N.W. 209; Stevens v. 
McDowell, 151 Kan. 316, 98 P.2d 410; 
Schroeder v. Woody, Or., 109 P.2d 597. 
[5] In those jurisdictions where in such 
a case an action for unlawful detainer lies, 
the practice under appropriate fact situa-
tions is to bring a suit in equity to enjoin 
the detainer action and determine the eq-
uities between the parties. See, Stubbs v. 
Austin, 285 Ill.App. 535, 2 N.E2d 358; Wil-
liam Weisman Holding Co. v. Miller, 152 
Minn. 330, 188 N . w / 7 3 2 ; Security Inv. 
Co. v. Meister, 214 Mich. 337, 183 N.W. 
183. In this jurisdiction, it appears to be 
the common practice, under such a contract 
as is here involved, to bring an unlawful 
detainer action against a defaulting vendee. 
See, Forrester v. Cook, supra. 
In the present action, respondents in their 
complaint set out the contract, which pro-
vided that upon default of the vendees the 
vendors might elect to terminate the con-
tract and upon such termination might re-
tain as liquidated damages the pa>ments 
theretofore made by the vendees; the lat-
ter thereupon becoming tenants at will of 
the former. Appellants contend, however, 
that the provision relative to liquidated dam-
ages is in fact a penalty provision and hence 
void. 
[6] Assuming that such an issue may 
properly be raised in an action such as thib, 
we must conclude that the forfeiture pro-
vision of the contract is just what it pur-
ports to be and not a penalty. The contract 
provided for no down payment. The 
monthly installments to be made were $20 
for the first six months; $25 00 per month 
the next six months; and $30 per month 
from then on until the entire sum had been 
paid. While appellants offered to prove 
that $2,000 worth of improvements had been 
made on the premises, such proof would 
not aid their cause since it was admitted 
that the net monthly income from the prem-
ises was $75. Such a monthly income would 
more than compensate for the improve-
ments made, plus the monthly installments. 
In view of the use value of the premises 
as compared to the monthly installment 
to be made, including improvements also 
made, we cannot say that the forfeiture 
provision was such that the trial court 
should have held it to be a penalty and re-
fused to permit respondents to maintain 
an action based on the invoking of such 
provision of the contract. Dopp v. Rich-
ards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98. 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs to respondents. 
WOLFE, LARSON, and PRATT, JJ., 
concur. 
MOFFAT, Chief Justice (concurring). 
I concur with the understanding that the 
unlawful detainer action does not cut off 
the right of the purchaser to bring suit to 
have equities determined if he claims eq-
uities in his favor. 
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tute a condition seriously detrimental to the 
child. Carl L. PINGREE et a!., Plaintiffs, 
Respondents, and Cross-Appellants, 
HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., con-
cur. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting): 
The main opinion sets forth the essential 
facts of this pitiable situation with com-
mendable candor and completeness. The 
trial judge appears to have given careful 
and thoughtful consideration to all aspects 
of the thorny problem it presents. His 
statements, including that quoted in the 
main opinion, indicate that he thinks there 
is neither a happy nor even a satisfactory 
solution; but that return of this unfortu-
nately retarded child to this unfortunately 
retarded and limited mother presents an 
"impossible" situation, which would un-
doubtedly soon result in a renewal and con-
tinuation of the difficulties that have exist-
ed in the past, wherefore, the best solution 
available is to leave the child where he is. 
It is my judgment that if the facts are 
looked at realistically in the light of the 
basic rules we have often expressed in such 
matters: that the paramount consideration 
should be the welfare of the child;l and 
that we should indulge considerable latitude 
to the discretion of the trial court,2 there is 
no basis shown to justify overturning his 
findings and judgment. I would therefore 
affirm them. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. 
Justice Crockett. 
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V. 
The CONTINENTAL GROUP OF UTAH, 
INC., a Utah Corporation, and Leslie W. 
Van Antwerp, Jr., aka L. A. Antwerp dba 
Van's Blue Ox, Defendants and Appel-
lants. 
No. 14484. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Dec. 22, 1976 
Landlord brought action against as-
signee of lease seeking order declaring pro-
vision granting assignee option to renew 
invalid for uncertainty or, in the alterna-
tive, decree declaring rental under renewal 
option to be $900 per month and seeking 
determination as to party responsible under 
lease for installation of fire escape. The 
Second District Court, Weber County, John 
F. Wahlquist, J , entered judgment in favor 
of landlord, and assignee appealed The 
Supreme Court? Maughan, J , held that evi-
dence supported award for repairs necessi-
tated by assignee, that issue concerning 
responsibility for installation of fire escape 
was moot; that option to renew lease was 
too vague and indefinite to be enforceable, 
so that lease terminated and, under provi-
sion of lease, assignee became tenant on 
month-to-month basis at amount equal to 
prior monthly rental, that landlord was not 
entitled to treble damages; and that as-
signee's refusal to vacate after service of 
notice of forfeiture and notice to vacate 
was wrongful and landlord was thus enti-
tled to reasonable rental value of property 
for period during which assignee wrongful-
ly refused to vacate. 
Affirmed, reversed in part, and re-
manded 
1. Landlord and Tenant <& 1^54(3) 
Evidence was sufficient to sustain 
amount of award to landlord for cost of 
2. State in Interest ofK-.-B.. , 7 Utah 2d 398, 
326 P 2d 395 
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repairs for which assignee of lease was re-
sponsible 
2. Landlord and Tenant o=> 152(4) 
Where a tenant covenants to repair, 
nature of alteration or improvement and 
reason for requiring it determines responsi-
bility for cost of compliance with health and 
safety laws, so that if tenant is required to 
make repairs which he would normally be 
required to make under his covenant or if 
alterations are required only because of 
particular use to which tenant is making of 
the premises, tenant should bear cost of 
compliance, but landlord should bear cost of 
compliance if ' 'structural" charges are re-
quired if they are not required because of 
particular use made of premises by tenant. 
3. Action <3=>6 
Where lease assignee's particular use of 
premises was reason that city directed that 
fire escape be installed and where assignee 
chose to stop activities necessitating fire 
escape, issue as to whether landlord or as-
signee was responsible for installation of 
fire escape was rendered moot. 
4. Contracts ®=>9(1), 15 
Condition precedent to the enforcement 
of any contract is that there must be a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, which 
must be spelled out, either expressly or 
impliedly, with sufficient definiteness to be 
enforced. 
5. Landlord and Tenant <fc=»86(l), 115(3) 
Where lease provided that tenant could 
renew lease and that rental amount for 
renewal period would be determined upon 
negotiation in which parties would be re-
quired to consider taxes, costs of business, 
business volume and success, insurance 
costs and so forth, option to renew was too 
vague and indefinite to be enforced and 
lease terminated at end of initial term, so 
that trial court erred in implying that par-
ties had agreed on reasonable rental figure 
and, under section of lease, assignee of 
lease which held possession after expiration 
of initial term became tenant on month-to-
month basis with rent at previous level. 
6. Landlord and Tenant e=>291(14) 
Landlord was not entitled to treble 
damages for any unlawful detainer on the 
part of assignee of lease where summons 
was not in accordance with mandatory pro-
visions of statute and complaint did not 
include any claim of forfeiture or unlawful 
detainer and where it was not until over 
four months after forfeiture was declared 
that landlord filed amended complaint 
alleging unlawful detainer. U.C.A.1953, 
78-36-3(5), 78-36-8, 78-36-10. 
7. Landlord and Tenant <3=>291(2) 
Notice of forfeiture of lease is suffi-
cient to terminate lease for breach of cove-
nant, but it is not sufficient to place lessee 
in unlawful detainer. U.C.A.1953, 78-36-1 
et seq., 78-36-3(5), 78-36-8. 
8. Landlord and Tenant <s=>281, 286 
Trial court properly determined that 
lease assignee's refusal to vacate leased 
premises after being served notice in which 
landlord stated that it declared forfeiture 
of lease for assignee's failure to correct 
deficiencies in maintenance of premises was 
wrongful and trial court properly awarded 
landlord possession of property and dam-
ages for time assignee remained in posses-
sion at reasonable rental value. 
9. Landlord and Tenant e=>286 
Generally, damages recoverable when a 
tenant wrongfully refuses to vacate after 
service of notice of forfeiture and notice to 
vacate are reasonable rental value of prem-
ises. 
10. Landlord and Tenant <3==>231(8) 
Evidence sustained trial court's finding 
that reasonable rental value of premises 
worth between $150,000 and $200,000 was 
$900 per month. 
Brian R. Florence, of Florence & Hutchi-
son, Ogden, for defendants and appellants. 
Edward P. Powell, of Christensen, Gard-
iner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 
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MAUGHAN, Justice: 
On appeal is a judgment of the District 
Court in an action for a Declaratory Judg-
ment involving a lease, together with a 
cross-appeal seeking treble damages for un-
lawful detainer. 
We affirm, in part, reverse, in part; and 
remand for elimination from the judgment 
all sums included because of failure to con-
struct the fire escape. No costs awarded. 
Statutory references are to U.C.A.1953. 
Plaintiffs, lessors of premises suitable for 
use as a restaurant initially leased to The 
Continental Group of Utah, Inc., hereafter 
Continental. Continental's interest was as-
signed, with the lessor's consent, to Leslie 
Van Antwerp, Jr., hereafter, defendant or 
lessee. In their complaint, plaintiffs sought 
an order declaring a provision granting les-
see an option to renew, invalid for uncer-
tainty. In the alternative, a decree declar-
ing the rental under the renewal option to 
be $900 per month, and a determination as 
to the one responsible under the lease for 
the installation of a fire escape. 
Upon trial to the court, plaintiffs were 
awarded judgment as follows: $4,000 dam-
ages for breach of the covenant to repair 
and maintain the premises and for lessee's 
failure to install a fire escape; $400 per 
month additional rent commencing October 
1, 1974, through February 1975; damages 
for holdover of the premises from March 4, 
1975, to January 15, 1976, in the sum of 
$9,450, with offset of $5,000 paid during 
this period ($90 per month reasonable rental 
value); $5,000 attorney's fees; and a decree 
terminating the lease and restoring posses-
sion. 
Lessors and Continental, the initial les-
sees, executed a lease for a term of five 
years, commencing October 1, 1969. The 
lease provided the premises were rented in 
an "as is" condition. The lessee covenant-
ed, at his sole expense, to maintain the 
exterior and interior of the building and 
improvements on the premises, including 
the roof, plumbing and electrical wiring, 
air-conditioning, and heating equipment, 
subject to reasonable wear and tear. Re-
served rent was $500 per month, plus three 
percent of the gross receipts, in excebS of 
$10,000. Beginning in 1970, Continental 
utilized the second floor of the premises for 
banquets and parties. In January 1972, the 
Fire Department of Roy City informed Con-
tinental this new use of the premises re-
quired the installation of a fire escape. 
In May 1972, Continental, with lessor's 
consent, assigned its leasehold interest to 
defendant. A representative of Continen-
tal testified defendant was informed it was 
his responsibility to install the fire escape, 
and to repair the floor. The trial court 
found defendant assumed all the rights and 
obligations under the lease, and defendant 
understood, at the time of the assignment, 
the lease required him to do all mainte-
nance; including changes made necessary 
by the public authorities. Further, defend-
ant assumed the obligation to repair and 
maintain any condition which occurred dur-
ing the occupancy of Continental. 
By a letter of September 24, 1974, lessors 
informed defendant of specific deficiencies 
in his maintenance, and in their amended 
complaint, they sought damages for breach 
of the covenant. The trial court found 
defendant had failed to make extensive re-
pairs within the covenant. Plaintiffs were 
awarded damages of $4,000 for defendant's 
failure to repair and maintain the premises, 
and to install the fire escape. 
On appeal, defendant contends there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain the finding 
he was responsible for the damages award-
ed. However, with the exception of the 
fire escape, the record does not sustain de-
fendant's contentions. 
A representative of defendant's predeces-
sor, Continental, testified the building was 
in good condition at the time defendant 
took possession. The records of the Health 
Department during 1974, indicated the need 
for repair of the premises Significantly, 
defendant did not contradict the testimony 
of Continental, to wit, he agreed he would 
be responsible for the repairs and installa-
tion of the fire escape. 
[1] Estimates of the cost of repairs were 
adduced, and the court was of the view, if 
the repairs were made, betterment would 
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be the result There is no evidence m the 
record to show the cost of the fire escape, 
which was not included in the estimate of 
repair of structural damage. The total esti-
mate for repairs without the fire escape 
was $4,564 The trial court did not allocate 
the $4,000 for delayed maintenance and the 
fire escape among the various cited defi-
ciencies. However, since there is evidence 
in the record to sustain the amount of the 
award, (excepting the fire escape), the find-
ing of the trial court is sustained. 
It was found the City of Roy directed the 
fire escape be installed, because of the use 
being made of the premises by the lessee; 
and defendant understood at the time of 
the assignment, it was his duty to do all 
maintenance; including changes made nec-
essary by public authorities. Defendant 
testified he used the upstairs for banquets 
and parties, which accounted for 10 to 20 
percent of his business. 
Gaddis v. Consolidated Freight ways,1 illu-
minates the several factors to be considered 
in determining who should bear the cost of 
compliance required by governmental au-
thority, in order to conform the premises to 
health and safety laws. 
[2] The court quoted the following from 
1 American Law of Property 353 
Where the lessee covenants to repair, 
the question of who should bear the cost 
of compliance depends upon the nature of 
the alteration or improvement and the 
reason for requiring it. If the order in-
volves mere repairs which the lessee 
would normally be required to make un-
der his covenant, he should bear the cost. 
Likewise, the burden is on the lessee 
where the alteration is required only be-
cause of the particular use which he is 
making of the premises, although it may 
be questioned whether even in this case, 
the court would place the burden of ex-
tensive and lasting improvements on the 
lessee, except perhaps where the lease is 
1. 239 Or 553, 398 P 2d 749, 22 A L R 3d 514 
(1965) 
2. See 22 A L R 3d 521, 539, Sec 8 "Where the 
tenant covenants to repair and the alterations 
for a long term At any rate, if the order 
requires the making of such improve-
ments, so-called "structural" changes, and 
they are not required because of the par-
ticular use made of the premises by the 
lessee, the lessor must bear the burden of 
compliance 
[3] In our matter, defendant had the 
responsibility to install the fire escape, had 
he continued to engage in activities which 
required it. Defendant's particular use of 
the premises was the reason the authorities 
required the installation.2 He was notified 
no business license would be issued were he 
to continue the prohibited use. Faced with 
this ultimatum defendant chose to stop the 
proscribed activities, thus rendering the fire 
escape responsibility moot. 
Defendant asserts error in the court's de-
termination that, under the option to re-
new, $900 per month was a reasonable rent-
al rate The lease contained the following 
renewal provisions, which were drafted by 
defendant's predecessor Continental* 
The Lessee shall have and is hereby 
granted the option to renew this lease for 
two separate additional five-year terms, 
commencing on the first month following 
the expiration of the term of this lease 
upon the same terms and conditions con-
tained herein except that the rental 
amount will be renegotiated; however, 
maximum total monthly rental shall not 
exceed $900.00 per month. 
Factors of tax increase, costs of busi-
ness increases or decreases, business vol-
ume and success, insurance costs and oth-
er reasonable allowances, will be the basis 
for terms of negotiation. 
Defendant gave lessors timely notice of 
his exercise of the option to renew. Lessors 
responded the new rental would be $900 per 
month Defendant replied citing the fac-
tors of the lease and explaining his costs of 
doing business had increased 81 per cent, 
and his volume had decreased 24 per cent. 
or improvements ordered by public authority 
are ordered because of the particular use the 
tenant makes of the premises, the tenant, and 
not the landlord, has been held obligated " 
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Defendant was willing to pay $500 per 
month. Lessors based their demand on the 
increase in taxes and insurance, interpret-
ing the provision "and other reasonable al-
lowances," as meaning they were entitled to 
a fair return on their investment in the 
premises. Evidence set the value of the 
premises to be between $150,000 and $200,-
000. 
The parties were unable to agree on the 
rental rate for the renewal period—result-
ing in this action. Defendant urges, if the 
factors set forth in the option were com-
pared to his evidence, it clearly illustrates 
error in setting the rent at $900 per month. 
Plaintiffs cross-appeal, asserting the trial 
court erred by not ruling the option for 
renewal void and unenforceable, on the 
ground it was too indefinite and vague. 
[4] Plaintiffs' contention is correct. If 
the factors are considered in view of the 
defendant's evidence, a low rental is justi-
fied. If the factors are weighed in light of 
plaintiff's evidence, the maximum rental 
would be appropriate. From the factors 
specified, a court cannot derive an objective 
standard applicable to both parties; i. e.t 
there is a material difference in the final 
result (the renewal rate), when the factors 
are analyzed in relationship to the position 
of each party. 
A condition precedent to the enforce-
ment of any contract is that there be a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, 
which must be spelled out, either express-
ly or impliedly, with sufficient definite-
ness to be enforced. .3 
Cited are the various rules of interpreta-
tion to support their positions. In Slayter 
v. Pasley* the court in a scholarly opinion 
set forth majority and minority rulings. 
The majority rule, in essence, is that a 
provision for the extension or renewal of 
a lease must specify the time the lease is 
to extend and the rate of rent to be paid 
with such a degree of certainty and defi-
niteness that nothing is left to future 
determination. If it falls short of this 
requirement, it is not enforceable. 
The court then explained the minority 
rule has two divisions. In the first, the 
provision is held enforceable if it clearly 
establishes a mode for ascertaining the fu-
ture rental rate, as by arbitration, or if 
there is an express declaration for a reason-
able rental during the extension period, or 
other words or phrases; which clearly con-
note and are legally synonymous with rea-
sonable rental. Under the second division 
of the minority rule, the court implies a 
mutual agreement for a reasonable rental. 
[5] In the current matter, the court im-
plied the parties had agreed on a reasonable 
rental figure, which the court proceeded to 
determine. This interpretation had the ef-
fect of nullifying the express factors speci-
fied by the parties, and substituting a new 
agreement to which the parties had not 
committed themselves. 
To attempt by judicial fiat to substi-
tute the legal concept of "reasonable 
rental" in lieu of the previously followed 
design of a fluctuating rental, measured 
by future uncontrolled and uncontrollable 
conditions, would, indeed, be to remake 
the contract for the parties and very pos-
sibly frustrate what to us appears to be a 
very important contrary intent concern-
ing the rental amount. . .5 
The option to renew was too vague and 
indefinite to be enforceable and the lease 
terminated by its own terms as of Septem-
ber 30, 1974. Under Section 28 of the lease, 
if the lessee holds possession after expira-
tion of the term, he becomes a tenant on a 
month-to-month basis in an amount equal 
to the prior monthly payment. The court 
erred in ordering defendant to pay an addi-
tional $400 per month rent from October 1, 
1974, to March 5, 1975. 
Plaintiffs' cross-appeal urging error in 
not being awarded treble damages for de-
fendant's unlawful detainer under 78 36-
3. Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362 4. 199 Or 616, 264 P 2d 444, 446 (1953) 
P.2d 427 (1961). 
5. Id p 451 of 264 P 2d 
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10 Defendant asserts this ruling of the 
trial court should be sustained 
Plaintiffs initially sent a letter to defend-
ant on September 24, 1974, setting forth 
deficiencies in the maintenance of the 
premises. Plaintiffs stated, if the deficien-
cies were not corrected within thirty days, 
"you are hereby notified of lessors intent to 
forfeit, cancel and terminate this lease. 
Later, there were several meetings be-
tween the parties and the repairs were dis-
cussed On February 26, 1975, plaintiffs 
served notice on defendant, which stated 
they "hereby declare a forfeiture" of the 
lease for the lessee's failure to correct the 
deficiencies set forth in the letter of Sep-
tember 24, 1974 The lessors informed les-
see he was a tenant at will, and ordered him 
to vacate the premises within five days. 
Lessee was informed if he failed to vacate, 
an unlawful detainer proceeding would be 
commenced and he would be liable for tre-
ble damages. 
On March 17, 1975, defendant was served 
with summons and complaint, for the de-
claratory judgment action. The summons 
was not in accordance with the mandatory 
provisions of 78-36-8, and the complaint 
did not include any claim of forfeiture or 
unlawful detainer. It was not until July 21, 
1975, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, 
alleging unlawful detainer 
[6,7] In Gerard v. Young,6 this court 
held that a plaintiff, to bring his case under 
the Forcible Entry and Detainer statute, 
must comply with the provisions of 78-36-
8 For plaintiffs failure to comply with this 
statute, the trial court properly ruled they 
were not entitled to treble damages In 
addition, plaintiffs' declaration of forfeiture 
was not conditional as required by 78-36-
3(5). This court has consistently ruled a 
notice of forfeiture is sufficient to termi-
nate a lease for breach of a covenant, but it 
6. 20 Utah 2d 30, 432 P 2d 343 (1967) 
7. Jacobson v Suan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 68, 278 P 2d 
294 (1954), Ensman v 0\erman, 11 Utah 2d 
258, 358 P2d 85 (1961), Van Zyverden v Far-
rar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 468 (1964), Fire-
is not sufficient to place the lessee in un-
lawful detainer. This for the reason the 
statute requires an alternative notice, viz, 
the tenant either perform, or quit; before 
he can be held in unlawful detainer, and be 
subject to treble damages.7 
[8-10] The court was correct in its rul-
ing that defendant's refusal to vacate was 
wrongful, after the service of the notice of 
forfeiture and to vacate on February 26, 
1975. The amended complaint filed by 
plaintiffs in July was a common law action 
for ejectment. The court properly awarded 
plaintiffs possession of the property, and 
damages for the time defendant remained 
in possession. Damages recoverable under 
such circumstances are generally the rea-
sonable rental value of the premises.8 The 
reasonable rental value was found to be 
$900 per month; such sum is sustained by 
the evidence. 
HENRIOD, C. J , and ELLETT, CROCK-
ETT and WILKINS, J J , concur. 
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Kriste A. PITKIN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of 
Utah and Preston's Incorporated, 
Defendants. 
No. 14588. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 30, 1976. 
A workmen's compensation claimant 
appealed from an order of the Industrial 
Commission denying compensation. The 
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that there 
man's Insurance Co v Brown v Fullmer, 529 
P2d 419 (Utah 1974) 
8. 32 A L R 2d 582, Anno Measure of damages 
for tenant's failure to surrender possession of 
rented premises, Sec 4, p 589 
